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(J IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA 
COpy 
LOU ANN MURPHY, INDIVIDUALLY AND) 
ON BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY ) 
SITUATED, ) 
CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.: 2006CVI25407 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PHILIP M. PEAD, DAVID E. MCDOWELL, 
JOHN W. CLAY, JR., JOHN W. DANAHER, 
M.D., CRAIG MACNAB, C. CHRISTOPHER 
TROWER, JEFFREY W. UBBEN, AND 














FILED IN OFFICE ~ 
OCT 22 2007 I '2J 
DEPUlY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
. FULTON COUNlY, G~ 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. After reviewing the 
briefs submitted by the parties on this issue, the record of the case, and the arguments presented 
by counsel during the oral argument held on October 9, 2007, this Court finds as follows: 
FACTS: 
Plaintiff filed her derivative complaint in November 2006, after the announcement of a 
proposed merger between Per-Se Technologies, Inc. ("Per-Se") and McKesson Corporation 
("McKesson"). At the time of the merger, Plaintiff was a shareholder in Per-Se, which is a 
Delaware corporation. In her complaint, Plaintiff named Per-Se as a nominal Defendant and listed 
the seven individual directors ofPer-Se: Phillip M. Pead, Chairman of the Board and CEO, David 
E. McDowell, manager and former CEO, John W. Clay, Jr., John W. Danaher, M.D., Craig 
MacNab, C. Christopher Trower, and Jeffrey W. Ubben (hereinafter collectively, the 
"Defendants"). 
() In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges breaches of fiduciary duties on behalf ofPer-Se Board of 
Directors. First, Plaintiff alleges that the inadequate price ofthe merger breached the Director 
Defendants' fiduciary duties of care, good faith, and faimess. Second, Plaintiff alleges that the 
proxy statement regarding the merger omitted material information and breached the Defendants' 
fiduciary duties ofloyalty and disclosure. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants aided and 
abetted each other in breaching their fiduciary duties. 
Per-Se provides financial and administrative healthcare solutions for hospitals, physicians 
and retail pharmacies. From 2005 through the time of the announced merger, Per-Se had been 
steadily increasing its revenue and share price from $IS/share to $20/share. In January 2006, Per-
Se acquired NBC Health and prepared to work with McKesson as a customer. According to 
Defendants, prior to the McKesson merger the Per-Se Board had been approached by other 
() interested buyers, but had never approved due diligence to move forward or otherwise acted upon 
any proposal. 
By September, 2006, the Per-Se Board learned of McKesson's interest in acquiring the 
company and on September 12, 2006, Per-Se was formally approached with an offer price of$27-
28/share. This initial McKesson offer was rejected by the Per-Se Board as inadequate. 
McKesson, however, countered with a second offer on September IS, 2006, with a price range of 
$28-29/share. The second McKesson offer was subject to due diligence and required that Per-Se 
agree to an exclusive bidding (i.e., no auction) option. The Per-8e Board approved due diligence 
to go forward and granted McKesson's exclusive bidding option through October 31, 2006. 
While the due diligence was being performed, the Per-Se Board met five times to discuss 
the McKesson negotiations. In addition, the Per-Se Board hired outside legal counsel and 
financial advisors. The Blackstone Group, as financial advisors, provided the Defendants with a 
o 
Q 
fairness opinion on the $28/share price offered by McKesson. Additionally, at the request of 
McKesson, the Per-Se Board approved an extension of the exclusive bidding option past October 
31,2006. 
Prior to the Board's vote, Blackstone Financial submitted a fairness opinion endorsing the 
adequacy ofthe offer price at $28/share. On November 5, 2006, the Per-Se Board unanimously 
approved the merger at the price of$28/share and announced it the following day. Plaintiff filed 
her complaint on November 6, 2006. 
The $28/share price was a 12% premium above the previous 20-day average of the stock 
and a 14.5% premium on the previous day's trading close price. The Per-Se stock, however 
reached a Nasdaq price high of$27.66 on November 3,2006 (the day before the merger was 
accepted) and traded for $27.83 on December 21,2006, after the announcement of the merger. 
Per-Se filed its preliminary proxy statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
on December II, 2006 and the final proxy statement on December 21,2006. On January 24, 
2007, the Per-Se Shareholders held a Special Meeting and approved the merger at $28/share by 
an approval of99.9% of the voting shareholders. On January 26,2007, the Per-SelMcKesson 
merger was consummated. 
STANDARD: 
A party seeking a motion to dismiss brought under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)( 6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted must demonstrate that plaintiffs allegations in the 
complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state 
of provable facts asserted in support thereof Common Cause/Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 279 Ga. 
480, 481 (2005). 
The internal affairs of a corporation, such as actions involving officers and directors, shall 
be regulated by the law of the state of incorporation. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., 
Architects & Planners. Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735 (1985). Whether or not the director defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and other Per-Se shareholders shall be governed by 
Delaware law under the internal affairs doctrine. 
COUNT II BREACH OF DUTY OF DISCLOSURE: 
The threshold issue to be decided by this Court relates to disclosure. Because the Per-Se 
shareholders approved the Per-Se/McKesson merger by 99.9% on January 24, 2007, Defendants 
assert that the actions of the board were ratified. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 
Supr., 1985); In re Wheelabrator Tech. Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1990 WL 131351, *9 16 
Del. 1. Corp. L. 1653, 1668 (Del. Ch. 1990); Weiss v. Rockwell Intern. Com., 1989 WL 80345, 
C) *3 (DeI.Ch. 1989) (holding that ''the effect of a valid shareholder ratification is to cure any defect 
in the ratified transaction"). Thus, Defendants argue that regardless of any alleged defects in the 
pro.cess by which the merger was appro.ved by the Per-Se Board, the shareholder ratification 
cured any such defects and prevents Plaintiff's action from moving forward. 
Plaintiff, however, states that only the vote of "fully informed shareholders" can ratifY a 
board's actions. Smith v. Van Gorkorn, 488 A.2d at 890. Plaintiff in Count Two of her 
complaint alleges breach of the duty ofloyalty and disclosure for the statements and omissions in 
the Per-Se proxy statement, which was the basis of information for the shareholder vote. 
Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the pro.xy statement as deficient because it alluded to previous 
sale offers but included no details (e.g., share price, buyer identity, etc.) ofthe proposed offers. 
In the "Background of the Merger" section of the proxy statement, Per-Se stated: 
(~ "In evaluating our pro.spects and growth opportunities, our board has also considered whether 
o the sale ofPer-Se would be in the best interests of our stockholders. In addition, our board has 
considered on several occasions specific sale opportunities proposed by large, potential strategic 
acquirers. In each of these cases, we and the potential acquirer tenninated discussions prior to the 
consunnnation of any transaction for a variety of reasons." Plaintiff asserts that the Per-Se 
Board's reference to such "sale opportunities" but failure to provide full information was a 
material omission in violation of the Board's fiduciary duty of disclosure. 
Directors of a corporation owe its shareholders a duty offull disclosure with regard to 
proxy statements or any other disclosure made in "contemplation of shareholder action." Arnold 
v. Society for Savings Bancopr, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1993), citing, Stroud v. Grave, 
6602. Ad. 75, 84-85 (Del, 1992); see also, Lvnch v. Vickers Energy Com., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 
1978) (holding that directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders which requires "complete 
o candor" in fully disclosing all facts and circumstances surrounding the offer). To state a claim for 
o 
breach of a director's fiduciary duty to disclose on the basis of omitted facts, a plaintiff must 
"plead facts identifYing (I) material, (2) reasonably available, (3) information that, (4) was omitted 
from the proxy materials." CrescentlMach I Partners, LP v. Turner, 846 A. 2d 963, 987 (Del. Ch. 
2000). 
Whether or not the omitted information is "material" is the essential inquiry. Arnold, 650 
A.2d at 1277. Material information is that with a substantial likelihood that the undisclosed 
infurmation would significantly alter the "total mix" of information already provided or ifit would 
be important in formulating a shareholder vote. Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 
1174 (Del. 2000); see also, Arnold v. Soc'y for Savings Bancopr, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 
(Del. 1993). Materiality is detennined from the perspective of a reasonable shareholder. 
Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 987 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
CJ While Defendants urge this Court to find such omissions nmnaterial as a matter oflaw, 
Plaintiff cautions the Court that such a determination is often a mixed question oflaw and fact not 
appropriate for determination at the motion to dismiss stage ofiitigation. Crescent/Mach I 
Partners, LP v. Turner, 846 A,2d 988 (declining to hold omissions iImnaterial as a matter of law 
and denying the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claiIn); see also, Khanna v. McMinn, 
2006WL1388744 * 29 (Del. Ch. 2006) (cautioning that a materiality determination occurs 
infrequently at the motion to dismiss stage, but may occur when "no set offacts could be proved 
that would permit the plaintiffs to obtain relief under the allegations made ... "). 
In Arnold, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the proxy statement was incomplete 
because it referred to earlier firm bids, but did not explain the proposed transactions. Arnold v. 
Soc'y for Savings Bancopr, Inc., 650 A,2d 1270. 'We hold only that, once defendants traveled 
o down the road of partial disclosure of the history leading up to the Merger and used the vague 
C) 
language described, they had an obligation provide the stockholders with an accurate, full and fair 
characterization of those historic events." Id. at 1280. In Arnold, the Bancorp Board disclosed 
an earlier offer from the buyer (the "May Offer"), why it was rejected and the details ofthe 
negotiations leading upon the proposed merger. The proxy statement did not disclose, among 
other facts, a contingent bid for a division of Ban corp (which was not being sold separately, but 
which received several individual bids to purchase) for $275 M made in conjunction with the May 
Offer. The Delaware Chancery Court found that the there was a substantial likelihood that such 
information would have significantly altered the "total mix" of voting information. Id. at 1281 
("The voting choice of a stockholder included the decision of whether it was better to remain a 
stockholder in a continuing Bancorp with FAC as an asset. .. or to be transformed into a 
stockholder in a new entity with Bancorp's asset/liability mix plus other assets and liabilities 
o combined as part of the surviving entity."). 
In Arnold, the undisclosed material bid was a definitive offer tendered after due diligence 
and in connection with the company's publically-announced intention to analyze possible mergers. 
The undisclosed material bid in Arnold offered a premium (i.e., higher price) for a division ofthe 
company and was contemporaneous (i.e., in competition) with offers from the successful buyer. 
In this case, Plaintiff complains of a single sentence contained in a three page description 
of the background of the merger which reads "our board has considered on several occasions 
specific sale opportunities proposed by large, potential, strategic acquirers." In her complaint, 
Plaintiff asserts merely that "the [identity of offerors and price/share offered]" would have 
certainly been material to Per-Se shareholders in determining whether to approve or reject the 
proposed merger with McKesson." Plaintiff, however, includes no facts that were omitted from 
o the proxy statement, were material to the shareholder vote, and reasonably available for inclusion. 
() 
See, Crescent/Mach I Partners, LP v. Turner, 846 A. 2d 963, 987 (Del. Ch. 2000). Plaintiff did 
not .identifY a single offeror, proposed transaction, or offer-price which should have, but had not, 
been disclosed to Per-Se shareholders in the proxy statement. Plaintiff identified no definitive, 
contemporaneous, or higher offers that the Directors failed to disclose, and Plaintiff failed to raise 
these concerns at a time when the Per-Se Directors could rectifY the harm. Accordingly, Plaintiff 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted regarding Defendants' duty to disclose. 
See, In re RCA Inc., 2006 WL 3480273, *6-9 (Del.Ch. 2006); Khanna v. McMinn, 
2006WL1388744 * 36-37 (Del. Ch. 2006. 
Therefore, in accordance with the above-stated reasons, this Court hereby GRANTS 




COUNT I BREACH OF DUTIES OF CARE AND LOYALTY: 
Because this Court dismissed Plaintiff's challenges to the disclosures in the proxy 
statement, the 99.9% approving shareholder vote ratified any alleged-wrong doing by Defendants 
in Count I for breach of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. "A merger can be sustained, 
notwithstanding the infinnity ofthe board's action, ifits approval by majority vote of the 
stockholders is found to have been based on an informed electorate." In re Wheelabrator Tech., 
Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1990 WL 131351, *8 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 1990); see also Weiss v. 
Rockwell Intl'l Com., 1989 Del. Ch. Lexis 94, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 19,1989). 
In Count I, Plaintiff complains of an inadequate offer price citing prior share prices and 
revenue trends ofPer-Se and of inadequate process citing the failure to auction the company. A 
breach of fiduciary duty analysis in the context ofa merger ''begins with the rebuttable 
presumption that a board of directors acted with loyalty and care." CrescentlMach I Partners, LP 
v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 979 (Del. Ch. 2000). In order to rebut this presumption, a plaintiff 
must "allege facts, which, if accepted as true, establish that the board was either interested in the 
outcome ofthe transaction or lacked the independence to consider objectively whether the 
transaction was in the best interest of its company and all ofits shareholders." Orman v. CuIhnan, 
794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that the merger was an "attempt by the Director 
Defendants to aggrandize or, at a minimum to maintain their personal and financial positions and 
interests through continued management position, and to enrich themselves to the detriment of the 
public stockholders ofthe Company. Defendants did not exercise independent business 
judgment. .. " Plaintiff's complaint, however, contains no other factual allegations to challenge the 
independence of the Director Defendants. In addition, the complaint states that the proxy 
o statement disclosed "the substantial financial incentives that Director Defendants personally had 
for accepting and soliciting shareholder approval ofthe acquisition proposal, regardless of the 
adequacy ofthe consideration given to shareholders." Plaintiff, however, claims no defect in the 
disclosures made in the proxy statement with regard to the Per-Se Directors' interests in the 
transaction. 
Plaintiff alleges no factual basis to challenge the independence ofthe Director Defendants 
sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule. In addition, Plaintiff levies no challenge to the 
proxy statement disclosures regarding directors' interests, thus the shareholder vote on January 
24, 2007 ratified not only the merger, but also the process. For the foregoing reasons, this Court 
hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count 1. 
COUNT III AIDING AND ABETTING BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES: 
o Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count III Aiding and 
Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty or argue this count before the Court. In an abundance of 
caution, however, this Court will address Plaintiffs third and final count. 
Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Defendants violated fiduciary duties owed to Per-Se 
shareholders and have "aided and abetted each other in unanimously accepting Buyer's proposal 
for an unfair and inadequate price, and in failing to take necessary steps to ensure that 
shareholders received the maximum value realizable for their shares." In order to state a claim for 
aiding and abetting a breach ofa fiduciary duty, Plaintiff must allege "(1) the existence ofa 
fiduciary relationship, (2) the fiduciary breached its duty, (3) a defendant, who is not a fiduciary, 
knowingly participated in a breach, and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulted from the concerted 
action of the fiduciary and non-fiduciary." Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, 
o L.P., 817 A.2d 160,172 (Del. 2002), citing, Fitzgerald v. Cantor, 1999 Del. Ch. Lexis 52, at *1 
I:J (Del. Ch. 1999). 
C) 
CJ 
Plaintiff's claim of aiding and abetting fails for two reasons. First, in this Order the Court 
dismissed both of Plaintiff's claims of breach of fiduciary duty, thus there is no underlying breach 
upon which to assert a claim of aiding and abetting. Second, all of the Defendants were Per-Se 
Directors, and therefore, fiduciaries during the time period in question. Thus, Plaintiff failed to 
properly plead the third prong of an aiding and abetting claim. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Count III. 
Having disposed of all of Plaintiff's claims in this Order, this case is hereby DISMISSED 
with PREJUDICE. 
SO ORDERED this ;;l, d-- day of 0 uJ-. , 2007. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
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